Herding by mutual fund managers in the Athens stock exchange by Theriou, Nikolaos G. et al.
European Research Studies,  
Volume XIV, Issue (4), 2011 
 
 
Herding by Mutual Fund Managers in  
the Athens Stock Exchange 
 
Nikolaos Theriou1, George Mlekanis2, Dimitrios Maditinos3 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Behavioural finance is a paradigm receiving great attention in the last decades and 
shaking the foundations of modern finance. A broadly discussed behavioural bias is herding, 
i.e. the tendency of investors to imitate each others’ decisions. Herding is a phenomenon 
with far-reaching implications for financial markets, but its importance becomes even larger 
if it is exhibited by institutional investors. The present study attempts to investigate whether 
mutual fund managers in Greece herd when investing in the Athens Stock Exchange in the 
period 2001 – 2006. For this purpose, semi-annual portfolio holdings of 31 mutual funds are 
analysed using the methodology proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992). The study concludes 
that mutual fund managers undoubtedly herd, with the extent of herding being irrelevant to 
the price movements observed in the market. Managers herd primarily when they trade in 
large capitalisation stocks or stocks that belong to the most “famous” indices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Finance has traditionally been based on a specific set of assumptions 
regarding human behaviour. These assumptions, known as the VM (Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern) axioms, are highly questionable as a mode of behaviour, because 
they imply that investors are totally keen, penetrating and rational in calculating the 
numbers that are required for making investment decisions (Frankfurter and 
McGoun, 2001). Nevertheless, due to their simplicity and suitability for advanced 
mathematical models, these assumptions have formed a foundation that had not been 
questioned for several decades. This approach is termed “traditional finance” and its 
cornerstones are the Expected Utility (EU), the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) paradigms. Today, this point of view 
is less widespread and it has become less plausible. The reasons are the 
extraordinary events of the last two decades of the twentieth century and primarily 
the emergence of a new approach (De Bondt, 2004). 
The new approach attempts to reconsider the concept of the “homo 
economicus” altogether. The supporters of this point of view state that finance needs 
to be redefined so that it reliably represents the actions of real people. According to 
Frankfurter et al. (2004), the limitations of the traditional model have become too 
obvious to be ignored. This line of thought has been called “Behavioural Finance” 
by its supporters and draws many of its concepts from psychological findings 
regarding human behaviour. Limits to the exercise of arbitrage that have been 
documented (Barberis and Thaler, 2002) further question the validity of the main 
argument of the traditional approach, namely that deviations from the model’s 
prescriptions will quickly disappear. Although heavily disputed and still 
controversial (opponents of the theory call it “the anomalies literature”) Behavioural 
Finance (BF) is an idea that has shaken the very foundations of the traditional 
finance theory. BF does not refer to a single mode of human behaviour in order to 
explain phenomena, but rather on different human responses to various 
circumstances. Therefore, many different modes of behaviour that deviate from the 
prescriptions of traditional finance have been formed into categories explained by 
specific psychological traits. One interesting phenomenon is termed “herding” and 
refers to the tendency of people to imitate each other for various (rational or 
irrational) reasons when making decisions (Lemieux, 2003, 2004). 
Herding becomes more important if such behaviour is exhibited by finance 
professionals and experts, since they are purported to be the most “rational” and 
“efficient” persons according to the traditional approach. Should these individuals 
not verify the traditional approach with their behaviour, the paradigm cannot hold at 
all. Several studies have been conducted to investigate the presence of herding by 
institutional investors and other professionals and the results might be considered 
controversial.  
The present study attempts to investigate whether institutional herding can 
be established for mutual fund managers active in the Athens Stock Exchange (or 
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ASE). For this purpose, the semi-annual holdings of 31 mutual funds trading in the 
ASE between 2001 and 2006 have been gathered from the mutual fund management 
companies and the data have been analysed according to the methodology proposed 
by Lakonishok et al. (1992). The analysis confirms the existence of mutual fund 
managers’ herding in the ASE throughout the period under examination. 
Furthermore, herding behaviour is documented primarily for large capitalisation and 
more renowned shares, leading to a set of questions regarding the quality and 
maturity of the market. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 
reviews theoretical concepts and empirical findings regarding Behavioural Finance 
and especially herding. Section 3 presents the purpose, the sample and the 
methodology of the research conducted. Section 4 provides the statistical analysis 
and the empirical results and Chapter 5 concludes the paper with the most important 
findings and limitations of the presented research. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
A main accusation of the traditional paradigm proposed by the supporters of 
BF is the lack of testability and predictive power of the traditional models, due to the 
unrealistic assumptions (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000; Shefrin, 2001a, 2001b; 
Kirman and Tuinstra, 2005). These features are considered the cornerstones of a 
modern science. On the other hand, their opponents typically claim that behavioural 
models are based on ambiguous assumptions of irrationality that cannot be 
disciplined by rigorous mathematics, leading to models that lack testable predictions 
of market behaviour (Brav et al. 2004). They also declare that, since the 
psychological biases that can be used to build behavioural models are numerous, it is 
difficult to distinguish data mining from genuine patterns (Chen, 2004). 
There are, nevertheless, behavioural biases that have been documented and 
acknowledged by both sides. In this case, the emphasis lies on whether these biases 
are persistent and moreover on whether they affect the market structures and prices. 
Should these modes of behaviour be unable to cause stable deviations from the 
predictions of the traditional paradigm, there is no need for further examination, 
since the EMH does allow for short-term divergences in the market that are 
corrected (and exploited) by the “rational” investors. However, should long-term 
deviations appear, the expected utility model is at peril (Stangle, 2005).  
One of the biases that claim to lead to persistent mispricing is called 
herding. Herding refers to the human tendency to imitate the behaviour of others, 
which leads to a group of people acting in a similar way (Lemieux, 2003, 2004). 
Herding can be a temporary “irrational” mode of behaviour by an individual, 
without further implications for the market, but it is often a very “rational” choice on 
the individual level, although it establishes a distinct deviation from the rational 
expectations paradigm. For example, herding behaviour exhibited by market 
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participants has been proposed as the reason for the heavy tails observed in the 
distribution of stock market returns (Cont and Bouchaud, 2000).  
Several reasons for rational herding have been proposed. These can be 
categorised into imperfect information, reputational concerns and compensation 
structures, although these categories are interdependent factors of herding 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). The first type of herding can be assumed to 
apply primarily for individual investors, while the other two broad categories are 
usually linked to institutional investors (Sias, 2004).  
The most usual phenomenon based on imperfect information is cascading, 
i.e. the situation where an investor is influenced by others acting before him and 
decides to undervalue or even ignore his own (private) information and estimation 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
Herding becomes a very interesting phenomenon if it can be traced in the 
behaviour of institutional investors, because this type of investor makes up a large 
proportion of the trading volume and their behaviour affects market prices. 
Furthermore, professionals, who are purported to be extremely rational, 
knowledgeable and keen according to the criteria of the “rational investor” referred 
to by the EMH paradigm, manage the funds. Should these investors exhibit 
behavioural biases, there is hardly any person left to prove that the models proposed 
by the traditional school of thought are realistic (Keim and Madhavan, 1995). For 
these reasons, institutional herding is considered and evaluated separately as a 
matter for discussion (Sias, 2004). 
Institutional investors may herd not so much because of imperfect 
information, although this might happen as well, but primarily (and for the long 
term) due to reputational concerns (Bernhardt et al. 2006) and compensation 
structures (Clarke and Subramanian, 2006). An investment manager will probably 
not face personal professional damage if he fails when the others have failed as well, 
but is very likely to lose his job if he significantly underperforms the market 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Consequently, this could lead to permanent 
behavioural biases for the investment managers, since a risk-averse manager has a 
large incentive to follow the market consensus to avoid professional implications.  
There are many studies concerning the presence of herding in different 
markets and its potential impact on asset prices, which do not always reach the same 
conclusions.  
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) argue that the loss of investment managers’ 
job is more performance-sensitive for younger managers, which gives younger 
managers a stronger incentive to avoid unsystematic risk and to herd into more 
popular stocks.  
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) document strong positive correlation between 
changes in the portfolio holdings of institutional investors and returns measured over 
the same period. Their results suggest that institutional investors positive-feedback 
trade more than individual investors and that their herding behaviour has a larger 
impact on stock prices than that of individual investors.  
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Wermers (1999) analyses the trading activity of mutual funds to determine 
whether funds herd when they invest in shares and to investigate the impact of 
herding on share prices. Although mutual funds do not seem to herd substantially in 
the average share, since little such evidence is found, the levels of herding are much 
higher in trades of small shares and in trading by growth-oriented funds.  
Oehler and Chao (2000) analyse herding by institutions in the German bond 
market and their results resemble the conclusions of studies in the stock market, i.e. 
that there is only weak evidence of herding in individual bonds, while market-wide 
herding appears to be a relevant phenomenon. However, the degree of herding is 
generally lower than in the stock market, which can probably be attributed to the big 
variety of bonds.  
Iihara et al. (2001) use long-term data to examine the presence and effect of 
herding in the Tokyo Stock Exchange and conclude that both herding by institutions 
and herding by foreign investors affect stock prices.  
Hwang and Salmon (2001) use a linear factor model based on the cross-
sectional standard deviation of the factor loadings of the individual assets. Their 
model is used to examine the US, UK, and South Korean stock markets and find that 
herding toward the market returns is heavily affected by the Asian and Russian 
Crises in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Their study also suggests that advanced 
markets such as the US and UK are subject to smaller degrees of herding than 
emerging markets such as South Korea, which is explained by a larger degree of 
information asymmetry between investors in emerging markets than in advanced 
markets.  
Lobão and Serra (2002) concern themselves with the level of herding in the 
trades of Portuguese mutual funds. The overall level of herding observed in the 
market is very significant. The level of herding remains fairly constant over time or 
when a minimum number of funds to trade a given stock is imposed and it is 
significant in both sides of the market, purchases and sales. The average level of 
herding for Portuguese mutual funds is much higher than that found for the US and 
the UK mutual funds in previous studies, which suggests that herding is higher on 
more volatile markets.  
Kyröläinen and Perttunen (2003) examine momentum trading and herding 
of both active and passive investors during the information technology (IT) stock 
bubble period of 1997-2000 in Finland. They find that primarily large active 
investors engage in momentum trading. Active investors in general also tend to herd 
when taking their trading decisions, with their tendency to herd increasing 
monotonically every year.  
Hwang and Salmon (2004) propose an approach for the detection and the 
measurement of herding based on the cross-sectional dispersion of the factor 
sensitivity of assets. This method enables them to examine the presence of herding 
towards particular sectors in the market, including the market index itself. 
Furthermore, they claim to be able to critically separate such herding from common 
movements in asset returns caused by changes in the fundamentals. They find that 
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herding towards the market shows significant movements for the US and South 
Korean stock markets and appears to be persistent independently from any given 
market conditions. There is also evidence of herding towards the market portfolio 
both when the market is rising and when it is falling.  
Fong et al. (2004) utilize a database of daily trades and monthly portfolio 
holdings of active Australian equity managers to examine herding by institutional 
investors. The data suggest that active managers herd more when selling stocks, 
when trading in small stocks, and when moving between industries. They also find 
some evidence of leader-follower relationships; in particular, managers tend to 
follow those managers with higher past performance.  
Sias (2004) finds that institutional investors appear to be momentum traders. 
Only little of their herding behaviour, however, can be considered a result of 
momentum trading. Moreover, demand by institutions is more strongly related to lag 
demand by the institutions than lag returns. Institutional herding declines with time 
and seems to differ across capitalizations and types of investors.  
Chang and Dong (2005) use Japanese data and offer evidence at both 
portfolio and firm level that variations in firm idiosyncratic volatility are related to 
behavioural as well as fundamental factors. They find strong evidence that shares of 
firms subject to institutional herding have high idiosyncratic volatility and that the 
relationship between herding by institutions, firm earnings and idiosyncratic 
volatility remains significant in a joint regression.  
Massa and Patgiri (2005) test the theory of managerial herding based on 
reputational and career concerns by focusing on the mutual fund industry and 
studying how incentives included in managers’ contracts affect the magnitude of 
risks taken by managers and their herding. They argue that reputation and career 
concerns induce managers to herd and that compensation seems to contrast this 
tendency. A compensation structure with greater incentives might induce managers 
to enter categories with less effective herding and to adopt trading strategies 
different from their peers, thereby taking more risk.  
Voronkova and Bohl (2005) investigate the degree of herding by pension 
fund investors and whether they engage in feedback trading behaviour as well as 
their effects on prices in the developing stock market of Poland, where such 
investors face limitations in their investment activity. The values of herding and 
positive feedback trading for Polish pension funds found are considerably higher 
than the corresponding values reported for mature markets; these findings are 
attributed to the local regulatory framework that includes relative performance 
evaluation and penalties and the high concentration in the Polish pension fund 
industry. Herding is detected in both past winners and past extreme losers; however, 
they do not find a significant effect on the prices of Polish stocks due to herding and 
positive feedback trading by the institutions.  
Sharma et al. (2006) examine the behaviour of institutional investors during 
the internet bubble and crash of 1998-2001 in the US and its impact on stock prices. 
They find that all types of institutions displayed herding behaviour into internet 
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stocks during the bubble with a high intensity. Most importantly, they also find 
positive excess returns contemporaneous with institutional buy herding and negative 
abnormal returns (reversals) at the cease of the herding. This finding suggests that 
institutions’ herding behaviour created temporary price pressures, thereby probably 
contributing to the bubble. 
On the other hand, there are also studies denying the existence or influence 
of herding in stock markets, as for instance, Chang et al. (2000) for the US and 
Hong Kong markets, Henker et al. (2003) for the Australian stock market, and 
Demirer and Kutan (2006) for both Chinese markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen).    
 
 
3.  Research Method 
 
3.1 The Purpose of Study 
The present study aims to investigate the presence of herding in the trading 
behaviour of institutional investors in the Athens Stock Exchange. More 
specifically, the focus is on herding by managers of mutual funds available to Greek 
private investors. The importance of herding by this subgroup of “traders” has been 
documented previously. Another major reason why this issue is of interest lies in the 
fact that similar studies in different countries have led to contradictory results; there 
appears to be a tendency of higher levels of herding in less mature financial markets. 
Furthermore, no such study has yet been conducted for Greece (to the knowledge of 
the authors).  
Empirical research distinguishes between two types of herding in stock 
markets (Oehler, 1998): stock-picking herding, which refers to the tendency of 
managers to buy or sell a particular stock at the same time, and market-wide 
herding, which is the tendency to be on the same side of the market in general 
(buying or selling) without focusing on each stock separately. The second type of 
herding is a broader definition, which can be disputed by opponents of the 
behavioural finance theory; the fact that open-end mutual funds have to invest the 
capital entrusted every time there is an inflow may lead to a buying position that 
does not constitute herd behaviour (and the opposite). In this study, only stock-
picking herding is considered, so the hypothesis tested can be stated in the following 
way: 
 
H0: No stock-picking herding occurs in the behaviour of mutual funds in the ASE. 
H1: Stock-picking herding occurs in the behaviour of mutual funds in the ASE. 
 
This hypothesis is tested initially for the market as a whole (for all stocks), 
but it is considered informative to further examine the presence and magnitude of 
herding in particular sub-groups of the market. These sub-groups are the large 
capitalisation shares (the way they are defined by the ASE), the small and medium 
capitalisation shares, the shares that constitute two well-known indices of the 
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market, i.e. the General Index and the FTSE 20 index, and the shares in each of the 
seventeen industries identified by the governing body of the ASE. The results are 
then evaluated in comparison with the results for the market. 
 
3.2 The Sample 
The list of mutual fund management companies (henceforth, MFMC) 
provided by the “Association of Greek Investment Companies and Mutual Fund 
Management Companies” or, as it is usually abbreviated, “Association of Greek 
Institutional Investors” (henceforth, AGII) and containing twenty-five firms (at 
September 30th 2005) was utilised as the starting point for the data collection 
process. All open-end MFMC legally operating in Greece are members of the AGII. 
To reduce the amount of work necessary for the purpose of this research, firms with 
a market share of less than 0.30 percent of the total volume of funds managed at 
both January 1st 2005 and September 30th 2005 were excluded from the sample, 
leaving seventeen firms and 98.71 percent of the market to be considered. One of the 
MFMC (namely, Social Security Organisations MFMC) is responsible for managing 
the funds of the public insurance and pension funds and institutions and therefore 
does not resemble the other firms. Out of the remaining sixteen companies, seven 
responded to the request for data of their mutual funds (45.41 percent of the funds 
managed and 47.33 percent of the funds to be considered). The other nine firms 
chose either not to respond to the request or to allege the absence of a database of 
the data requested. Table 1 provides a list of the twenty-five firms, their relevant 
market shares and the availability of data concerning the mutual funds they manage. 
Since the study focuses on herding in shares, only mutual funds investing a 
significant proportion (over 10 percent) of their resources in shares were considered.  
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Table 1. Overview of the Mutual Fund Management Companies (MFMC) active in Greece, their 
market shares (September 30th 2005) and their response to the request for data 
Name 
Number 
of 
Funds 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
Provision of Data 
Alico AIG MFMC 16 1.76 
New company without sufficient 
data 
Allianz MFMC 10 1.18 Data available 
Alpha Asset Management 
MFMC 
25 17.28 Data available 
Alpha Trust MFMC 12 1.20 Data available 
Aspis International MFMC 10 0.78 
New company without sufficient 
data 
ATE MFMC 10 2.50 No response to request 
Attica MFMC 6 0.29 
New company without sufficient 
data 
Diethniki MFMC 21 23.21 Data available 
EFG MFMC 35 33.02 No response to request 
Egnatia MFMC 8 0.44 
New company without sufficient 
data 
European Reliance MFMC 8 0.23 Market share less than 0.30% 
Greek Postal Savings Bank & 
Hellenic Post MFMC 
3 0.22 Market share less than 0.30% 
Hellenic Trust MFMC 8 0.44 
New company without sufficient 
data 
Hermes MFMC 11 8.05 Data available 
HSBC (Hellas) MFMC 10 2.20 Data available 
ING Piraeus MFMC 12 2.23 No data – absence of database 
International MFMC 7 0.34 Data available 
Kyprou MFMC 5 0.81 No response to request 
Laiki MFMC 4 0.16 Market share less than 0.30% 
Marfin MFMC 10 0.09 Market share less than 0.30% 
Omega MFMC 7 0.15 Market share less than 0.30% 
P&K MFMC 12 0.50 No response to request 
Social Security Organizations 
MFMC 
2 2.77 Funds not traded publicly 
Profund MFMC 3 0.09 Market share less than 0.30% 
Proton MFMC 3 0.05 Market share less than 0.30% 
 
The Greek legislation demands that these companies publish every six 
moths (at June 30th and December 31st) a detailed report of their portfolio holdings 
resembling a balance sheet. This data is the only publicly available reports of the 
investment decisions made by the funds’ managers. Attempts to attain further data – 
data referring to direct investment decisions or to shorter intervals – addressed to 
some companies were rejected with the explanation that it would create much work 
and harm the companies’ interests. The study utilised data concerning portfolio 
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holdings from June 30th 2001 to June 30th 2006, because holdings of earlier periods 
were not accessible for many of the firms in the sample and furthermore because the 
crash in 1999 and 2000 in the Athens Stock Exchange might lead to unreliable 
results regarding the herding behaviour exhibited. The mutual funds whose portfolio 
holdings formed the database for the study appear in Table 2. 
Table 2. Mutual Funds forming the sample for the present study 
MFMC Mutual Fund 
Allianz MFMC Aggressive Strategy Domestic Equity Fund 
 Domestic Balanced Fund (Unit Linked) 
 Domestic Balanced Fund 
 Domestic Equity Fund 
Alpha Asset Management MFMC Athens Index Domestic Equities Fund 
 Domestic Equities Fund 
 Domestic Balanced Fund 
Alpha Trust MFMC Selected Value Domestic Equity Fund 
 Growth Domestic Fund 
 New Enterprises Domestic Equity Fund 
 Eurostar Domestic Balanced Fund 
Diethniki MFMC Blue Chips Fund 
 Financial Domestic Equity 
 Top-30 Domestic Equity 
 Information & Technology (Hi-Tech) Domestic Equity 
 Infrastructure & Construction Domestic Equity Fund 
 Small Cap Domestic Equity Fund 
 European Fund 
 Balanced Fund 
 "Syllogiko" Domestic Balanced 
Hermes MFMC Dynamic Domestic Equity 
 Protoporos Domestic Equity 
 Balanced Domestic 
HSBC (Hellas) MFMC Greek Equity Fund 
 TOP 20 Greek Equity Fund 
 Pan-European International Equity Fund 
 Emerging Markets International Equity Fund 
International MFMC Equity Fund Domestic 
 Domestic Balanced Fund 
 Equities Selection Equity Domestic Fund 
 Balanced Foreign Fund 
 
Furthermore, data concerning the fluctuation of the General Index of the 
ASE, the composition of certain indices and the classification of shares into groups 
and industries by the Stock Exchange where necessary. This data was obtained from 
the ASE directly. Since the composition of the indices and the classification of 
shares are not constant throughout the period examined, those stocks that changed 
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categories at some point in the period where not taken into consideration when the 
focus was on specific groups. 
 
3.3 Measured Variables 
For the estimation of herding this study has utilized the measure proposed 
by Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1992), henceforth LSV. This measure 
determines initially those mutual funds that have been buyers and sellers of a share 
in a given period; the herding of the managers in a share i in the period t is then 
calculated as  
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(1), where H(i) is the herding in stock i in period t, B(i) is the number of mutual 
funds buying the stock in the period, S(i) is the number of mutual funds selling the 
stock, p(t) is the average change that an active fund is a buyer for all stocks in the 
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 , and n is the number of funds trading the stock 
in the period, i.e.   n = B(i) + S(i). This function measures the herding in a particular 
stock (stock-picking herding), rather than the general tendency of the traders to be 
sellers or buyers in a certain period. The same measure has been utilised by a series 
of studies concerning herding for different markets and countries, sometimes with 
slight variations (e.g. Oehler, 1998, Wermers, 1999, Oehler and Chao, 2000, Lobão 
and Serra, 2002, and Voronkova and Bohl, 2005). 
The function used for calculating herding may obviously lead to disputable 
results if certain considerations are not made. For example, a company going public 
or issuing new shares would probably appear to have more buyers than sellers, 
although this cannot be considered herding behaviour. The opposite would be the 
case for a firm that is acquired or undergoes a merger or even goes bankrupt. To 
mitigate the effect of such incidents, function (1) is not calculated for a share 
whenever such an incidence occurs, except for the case of a new issue of an already 
listed firm (because it was impossible to determine the effect of each such case). The 
same treatment occurs whenever only one fund is trading in a stock (n=1), because 
the calculation would overestimate herding.  
 
 
4.  Statistical Analysis - Results 
 
The results of the analysis provide evidence of herding in the ASE as a 
whole, consistent with findings of other studies for developing markets. The H0 
hypothesis is clearly rejected for all periods. The herding measures calculated are 
provided in table 3. 
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Table 3. Results of the data analysis for the market as a whole 
Semi-annual Period 
Number of 
Shares Tradeda 
LSV 
Measure Significance (Two-Tailed) 
01.07.01 – 31.12.01 148 0.0934 0.000b 
01.01.02 – 30.06.02 155 0.1010 0.000b 
01.07.02 – 31.12.02 153 0.1197 0.000b 
01.01.03 – 30.06.03 147 0.0544 0.005b 
01.07.03 – 31.12.03 137 0.2194 0.000b 
01.01.04 – 30.06.04 135 0.0941 0.000b 
01.07.04 – 31.12.04 113 0.0541 0.018c 
01.01.05 – 30.06.05 102 0.0623 0.007b 
01.07.05 – 31.12.05 101 0.1624 0.000b 
01.01.06 – 30.06.06 109 0.1029 0.000b 
a The number of shares traded is the total number of all shares in which at least two mutual funds  
were active. 
b LSV measure significant at the 99 percent significance level. 
c LSV measure significant at the 95 percent significance level. 
 
It should be noticed that, although stock-picking herding appears to be 
relatively weak, nevertheless it remains statistically significant at a 99 percent 
significance level for nine out of ten periods and at a 95 percent significance level 
for the other period. Therefore, the presence of herding in the ASE as measured with 
the LSV function cannot be disputed. The following graph demonstrates how the 
extent of herding changes from period to period and also presents the changes in the 
price levels observed in the ASE. 
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Graph 1. Comparison of LSV measure with price movements in the ASE  
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The above graph 1 reveals large fluctuations of herding with time. These 
fluctuations, contrary to other studies, cannot be (statistically) associated with the 
price movements in the market. 
Further analyses attempt to identify the nature of the herding behaviour 
observed in the market. It can reasonably be assumed that managerial herding in 
shares of companies with little market capitalisation or in shares of firms that appear 
less in the financial news will occur primarily due to imperfect information and not 
due to reputational concerns. On the other hand, the opposite will probably be the 
case for shares with large market capitalisation or for shares that are more “famous” 
among financial investors, because information for these shares is plentiful. 
Therefore, shares are divided into large capitalisation shares and small and medium 
capitalisation shares and the herding measures are calculated for each group 
independently. The categorisation of the shares utilised is the one conducted by the 
Stock Exchange authorities. The following table displays the measures computed for 
each period compared with the market’s measures.  
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Table 4. Comparison of herding measures for large capitalisation companies, small and medium 
capitalisation companies and the market  
Period 
Large 
Capitalisation 
Small & Medium 
Capitalisation 
Market 
01.07.01 – 31.12.01 0.1667 (0.000a) 0.0168 (0.662c) 0.0934 (0.000a) 
01.01.02 – 30.06.02 0.1520 (0.000a) 0.0609 (0.062c) 0.1010 (0.000a) 
01.07.02 – 31.12.02 0.1460 (0.000a) 0.0538 (0.075c) 0.1197 (0.000a) 
01.01.03 – 30.06.03 0.1251 (0.000a) -0.0225 (0.541c) 0.0544 (0.005a) 
01.07.03 – 31.12.03 0.2073 (0.000a) 0.2722 (0.000a) 0.2194 (0.000a) 
01.01.04 – 30.06.04 0.1400 (0.000a) -0.0092 (0.812c) 0.0941 (0.000a) 
01.07.04 – 31.12.04 0.0615 (0.017b) 0.0200 (0.718c) 0.0541 (0.018b) 
01.01.05 – 30.06.05 0.1053 (0.000a) -0.2726 (0.003a) 0.0623 (0.007a) 
01.07.05 – 31.12.05 0.1907 (0.000a) -0.1773 (0.014b) 0.1624 (0.000a) 
01.01.06 – 30.06.06 0.1433 (0.000a) -0.0026 (0.955c) 0.1029 (0.000a) 
a LSV measure significant at the 99 percent significance level. 
b LSV measure significant at the 95 percent significance level. 
c LSV measure not significant at an acceptable level. 
 
From the above table it becomes obvious that the herding behaviour 
observed in the ASE can be attributed to the investment decisions regarding large 
capitalisation stocks. Small and medium capitalisation shares do not appear to be 
subject to herding, since only in one period the LSV measure can be conceptually 
explained and is statistically significant. The two other statistically significant values 
have no explanatory power, because they are negative. They are considered a result 
of the drawbacks of the LSV measure that have been identified previously. On the 
contrary, the herding measures for the large capitalisation firms are statistically 
significant in all periods and usually larger than those of the market. This is 
presented in graph 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 
Herding by Mutual Fund Managers in 
the Athens Stock Exchange 
 
Graph 2. Comparison of LSV measure for large capitalisation companies with the market’s 
measure 
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A further analysis conducted in order to identify the reasons for mutual fund 
herding in the ASE focuses on the trading behaviour concerning the shares 
comprising the two most renowned indices, the General Index and the FTSE 20 
index. Although both indices primarily include large capitalisation shares, and the 
effect of the “size” of a firm has already been shown previously, the shares 
comprising the indices represent the “fame” of a share as a reason for better herding 
behaviour and provide additional information about the trading patterns of 
managers. The results of the analysis for the General Index are shown in Graph 3:  
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Graph 3. Comparison of LSV measure for the General Index with the market’s measure 
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From the above graph 3 it can be concluded that herding in the General 
Index stocks is by far greater than that for the market as a whole. The measures 
calculated for the General Index are statistically significant at the 99 percent level 
for all periods. This graph displays that herding is greater for more popular shares, a 
finding strengthening the conclusion reached after comparing the herding measures 
for large capitalisation and small and medium capitalisation shares. In the following 
graph 4, the same analysis is presented for the FTSE 20 index. 
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Graph 4. Comparison of LSV measure for the FTSE 20 index with the market’s measure 
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We notice here that the results are also similar with those discussed 
previously for the General Index (graph 3). All measures are statistically significant 
at the 99 percent level, except for the LSV measures for period 5, which is 
significant at the 95 percent level, and for period 7, which is significant at the 90 
percent level. This may nevertheless be attributed to the small number of shares 
comprising the index. However, it is noticeable that herding in the FTSE 20 index 
appears to be slightly less intense than in the General Index; the General Index is 
older and more “famous” than the FTSE 20 index. 
Finally, the attempt to examine the presence of herding in each sector, 
according to the categorisation of the firms performed by the governing body of the 
ASE, did not yield significant results, because the small number of shares in most 
industries did not permit any meaningful statistical analysis. The following table 5 
presents the number of firms in each sector (only the firms whose category has not 
changed in the period under investigation are included).  
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Table 5. Industry sectors identified by the ASE and the number of companies in each sector 
 
Sector 
Average Number of 
Firms 
Oil & gas 2 
Chemicals 3 
Basic Resources 9 
Construction & Materials 14 
Industrial Goods & Services 10 
Food & Beverage 10 
Personal & Household Goods 10 
Health Care 2 
Retail 3 
Media 5 
Travel & Leisure 11 
Telecommunications 2 
Utilities 4 
Banks 10 
Insurance 1 
Financial Services 7 
Technology 11 
 
 
For the three industries with more than ten active shares the LSV measures 
were nevertheless calculated and are shown in Graph 5. Besides the fact that herding 
does not seem to differ significantly between the three sectors, no other conclusions 
can be drawn due to the small number of the firms. 
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Graph 5. Herding measures for the industries with the highest number of firms (statistically non-
significant values are not displayed) 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
The present study can be classified as part of the research concerning the 
existence and effect of herding. This research has led to a large volume of studies 
throughout the world that often reach contradictory conclusions. Herding is a bias 
identified by the proponents of the Behavioural Finance paradigm that has received 
a lot of attention internationally and has been documented for several markets. It has 
been claimed that the emergence of herding behaviour by investors can lead to a 
destabilisation of the market, creating bubbles and crashes. Herding becomes an 
even more important phenomenon if it is exhibited by institutional investors, as has 
been explained previously. 
The main goal of this study was to identify, during the period from January 
2001 to June 2006, whether the presence of herding by mutual fund managers active 
in the Athens Stock Exchange could be established. To accomplish this goal, the 
herding measure devised by Lakonishok et al. (1992) has been utilised. The research 
conducted led to the conclusion that, overall, managers herd in all semi-annual 
periods examined, with the measures calculated being similar to those observed by 
other studies for developing markets (Lobão and Serra, 2002). The measures are 
statistically significant throughout the period 2001 – 2006; therefore, although 
certain limitations of the methodology and the sample are acknowledged, the 
existence of a herding behaviour is sufficiently documented. It has not been possible 
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to associate the variation in the value of the LSV measure with the price movements 
of the General Index in the ASE (this index is purported by the ASE authorities to 
represent the market as a whole). 
Further analysis was conducted in an attempt to identify the reasons for 
herding by managers. The shares traded in the ASE were grouped into categories 
based on criteria set by the Stock Exchange itself. Using the market capitalisation as 
a criterion, shares were divided into large capitalisation shares and small and 
medium capitalisation shares. It was found that herding for large capitalisation 
shares is significantly higher than for the market as a whole in all periods, while 
herding for small and medium capitalisation shares could not even be documented at 
all (except for one period only).  
In addition, the shares comprising the most popular index of the ASE, the 
General Index, were also formed into a group. The same procedure was followed for 
the shares comprising the FTSE 20 index, which includes large firms with high 
reputations. The firms included in these indices can reasonably be considered 
“famous” and information for these firms is plentiful in the financial news. The 
measures for the General Index shares were overall significantly greater than those 
for the market. The same conclusion was drawn for the FTSE 20 index, although, 
due to the small number of shares comprising the sample, the measure was not 
statistically significant at the desired level for one period. 
The usefulness of the above analysis, apart from describing the herding 
behaviour observed more precisely, lies in the inferences that can be attempted 
about the reasons for managerial herding. Two main reasons for herding have been 
proposed: imperfect information and reputational concerns and compensation 
structures (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). Imperfect information as a reason for 
herding assumes the presence of information asymmetries or at least perceived 
information asymmetries. Such asymmetries are more likely to occur for shares with 
smaller market capitalisation or for less popular shares. On the other hand, the 
reputation of managers can be damaged more severely if wrong investments are 
made in shares with larger market capitalisation or in more popular shares, because 
their performance can more closely be monitored. From the above, the main 
argument extracted is that imperfect information as a reason for herding should lead 
to greater LSV measures for small and medium capitalisation shares, compared to 
the large capitalisation shares, and that index shares should be subject to smaller 
degrees of herding. The opposite should be the case for herding due to reputational 
concerns and compensation structures. Taking into consideration the measures 
actually calculated, the conclusion reached is that herding by mutual fund managers 
in the ASE most probably occurs primarily due to reputational concerns. 
Finally, the shares were grouped into categories based on the sector of the 
economy each firm is placed into by the governing body of the Stock Exchange. The 
ASE identifies seventeen industries and it was attempted to investigate differences 
in the intensity of herding between them. Unfortunately, the small number of firms 
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in each sector did not allow comparisons, since the measures calculated lack 
statistical significance in most cases. 
This study follows a pattern devised to conduct an initial examination of the 
herding behaviour in a market. In a sense, the measure calculated merely scratches 
the surface of this issue. It is possible only to infer the reasons of herding and the 
effect of this herding behaviour on the stock prices cannot be appreciated. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to distinguish genuine herding behaviour from 
decisions based on changes in the fundamentals. Nevertheless, since mature markets 
do not usually exhibit stock-picking herding, an important implication of this study 
is the fact that the ASE is still a developing market with important inefficiencies. 
Moreover, it is necessary to examine the investing strategies adopted by managers 
and to closer review their decisions. Perhaps it is the duty of the controlling body of 
the Stock Exchange to control market makers more closely, in order to prevent large 
market swings, bubbles and crashes due to herding.  
 
5.1 Limitations of the study 
The present study is subject to certain limitations and shortcomings, which 
are partially related to the layout of the study per se and partially to the measure 
utilised. As far as the study is concerned, it should be noticed that the sample does 
not cover a large proportion of the market, leaving the quality of the results under 
some dispute. As far as the measure is concerned, although it has been used widely, 
due to its simplicity and conceptual clarity, it carries certain drawbacks. First of all, 
the LSV measure cannot identify the reason managers are lead to similar decisions 
(Voronkova and Bohl, 2005). A severe change in the fundamentals of a firm or in 
the information available to traders would lead to a value similar to the one observed 
when great herding occurs. Although such large movements due to rational decision-
making are not very likely to appear, nevertheless the values observed must be 
treated with caution. 
Since the measure only captivates the change between two given reference 
points, it cannot trace strategies that occur inside a period (in this case, in the semi-
annual period) and are reversed in the same period (Oehler and Chao, 2000). This 
drawback cannot be overcome unless actual trading data become available. 
Furthermore, it does not measure the effect of the herding behaviour on the stock 
prices, which is a very important aspect of this issue. In order to estimate this effect, 
it would be necessary to consider the volume of the buy and sell trades and not only 
the number of active managers (Wermers, 1999). Also, it must be noticed that 
managers of funds managed by the same MFMC often share the same information; 
although this constitutes a form of herding, it is nevertheless often mentioned as a 
reason why the LSV measure might overestimate actual deliberate herding 
behaviour (Lobão and Serra, 2002). 
Finally, the measure overestimates herding when short-selling is prohibited, 
because the binomial distribution used as the basis for the calculations is not an 
absolutely realistic assumption (Oehler and Chao, 2000) and may underestimate 
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herding for low activity stocks, because the expression 
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
 (used in the formula to take into account random 
variations in the trading behaviour) may take large values (Lobão and Serra, 2002). 
It should be noticed that more sophisticated measures have been proposed 
for measuring herding, which focus primarily on share return dispersions, but they 
also face certain drawbacks and conceptual ambiguities (e.g. Hwang and Salmon, 
2001, Hwang and Salmon, 2004, and Demirer and Kutan, 2006). 
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